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Abstract
Several authors have proposed sketches as a suitable specication mechanism for specifying
databases. When specifying a database, the nite models of the specication are of greatest
importance, since an actual database is of course always a nite structure. In database theory
however, it has recently been recognised that it is useful to allow for a restricted kind of innite-
ness in the models of a data specication. The models are then so-called metanite structures.
In this paper, we consider a sketch-based specication of metanite structures, and we develop
and prove correct an algorithm to decide the semantical equivalence of the corresponding data
specications. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the rst algorithm for deciding
semantical equivalence for a non-trivial class of specications for metanite structures. c© 1999
Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
MSC: 18A15; 18A20; 18A25; 68P15
1. Introduction
Many structures operated upon by computer programs can conveniently be considered
to consist of two parts. The rst part is a nite, variable structure, which is completely
represented in the program and which varies with every run, or even during the run
of the program. The elements of this nite structure are labelled with elements of
a second, possibly innite, but xed structure. Consider for example a program for
the travelling salesman problem. This program operates on graphs, whose arrows are
labelled with numbers (say natural numbers). The nite variable part is the graph,
and the program will usually contain a representation of the entire graph. Subsequent
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runs of the programs will usually operate on dierent graphs. The innite xed part
is the set of natural numbers (with the usual operations). Although the program will,
at any given moment of time, consider only a nite number of natural numbers, it is
convenient, when reasoning about the program, to consider the innite part also in its
entirety. So the mathematical structures manipulated by computer programs can often
be subdivided in a nite, variable part and a possibly innite xed part, where the
elements of the variable part are labelled (again in a variable way) by elements of the
xed part. Let us call such a structure a metanite structure, following the terminology
introduced by Gradel and Gurevich [11].
In particular, a database (say for instance a relational database) is a structure
manipulated by a computer program, and it can conveniently be subdivided in two
such parts. The database consists of a nite set of nite relations over a number of
(possibly) innite domains. Hence, the tables containing the tuples of the relations are
the nite variable part, and the domains are the innite xed part. It is clear that, during
the evolution of the database, when facts are added or deleted, the tables containing
the tuples will vary, but the innite domains remain xed. Again, at any given moment
of time, only a nite part of these possibly innite domains is actually present in the
database. However, since the domains are usually well-known mathematical structures,
like the natural or rational numbers, or the monoid of strings over some alphabet, it
is again more convenient to consider them in their entirety when reasoning about the
database. This point is stressed in a very convincing way by Gradel and Gurevich [11].
Hence, already when building a semantic data specication, whose models will be
structures manipulated by a computer program, it will be advantageous to incorporate
in such a specication the separation between the variable nite part and the xed
innite part. The signature for such structures will contain a signature to talk about
the variable part, a signature to talk about the xed part, and some labelling functions
going from the variable part to the xed part.
The sketch-based approach to semantic data specications extends very naturally to
specifying metanite structures because in this approach a clear separation is made
between the entitities (the nite part) and the attributes (the innite part) [14, 17, 18].
Grosso modo, the sketch-based approach to metanite data specications looks as fol-
lows:
{ For the nite part, we use nitary sketches [3, 8] as the specication logic. These
sketches have more or less the expressivity of rst-order logic with the addition of
an operator constructing the reexive symmetric and transitive closure of a relation.
Any suitable logic to specify nite structures will certainly contain this as a fragment.
{ For the innite part, we only consider products of unstructured sets. Elements of the
nite part can be labelled with tuples of elements from unstructured sets.
Although this is clearly insucient as a general specication formalism, it is an
interesting starting point, because it covers a very large part of the existing formalisms
(like Entity Relationship diagrams) for semantic data specications [14].
This paper is structured as follows. First, in Section 2, we prove a number of un-
decidability results concerning nite nitary sketches. These results serve to show that
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the semantical equivalence problem in general is undecidable. In Section 3, we recall
some denitions and previous results from the sketch-based approach to semantic data
modelling. Then, in Section 4, we dene the class of thin FM specications, and for
this class of specications we prove that semantical equivalence is decidable. Finally,
in Section 5, we summarize the results of this paper, and compare with related work.
2. Finite satisability of nite nitary sketches
One of the main components of the semantic data specications that will be dened
in this paper is a sketch. In this section, we prove a number of undecidability results
for sketches. These undecidability results are not surprising, but because of the practical
relevance, it is interesting to see them proved. In Section 3, we will use these results to
prove the undecidability of the general semantical equivalence problem. We prove the
undecidability results by means of a satisability preserving translation from classical
rst-order logic to sketches.
The correspondence between sketches and classical logic has been investigated
thoroughly. Usually, the expressive power of sketches and fragments of logic is com-
pared by comparing their classes of model categories in Set. The locally presentable
categories are exactly the model categories of both limit sketches, and limit theo-
ries. Moreover, this correspondence also holds when restricted to the nitary case: the
locally nitely presentable categories are exactly the model categories of nitary limit
sketches, and nitary limit theories. The locally accessible categories are exactly the
model categories of both sketches and the so-called basic theories. However, this second
correspondence does not hold when restricted to the nitary case. A nitely accessi-
ble category need not be axiomatizable in a nitary basic theory, and a nitary basic
theory may have a model category that is not nitely accessible. All these facts are
treated in detail by Adamek and Rosicky [3]. For nitary sketches, it has been proved
recently [2, 4, 6] that they are equivalent (i.e. have the same model categories) to
-coherent theories. Adamek and Rosicky [5] have proved that the equivalence be-
tween nitary sketches and -coherent theories also holds when one considers models
in FinSet.
It is clear that the correspondence between sketches and string-based logic is not
very straightforward when one studies this correspondence based on the categories of
models. In particular, there is no clear correspondence with classical nitary rst-order
logic. To transfer some of the results obtained on classical rst-order logic, it would be
interesting to have some kind of correspondence between classical (nitary) rst-order
logic and nitary sketches. In this section, we describe such a correspondence.
The rest of this section is structured as follows. In Section 2.1, we recall some
basic denitions concerning classical logic and sketches. Then, in Section 2.2, we
describe a translation from classical rst-order logic to nite nitary sketches, and we
prove that this translation preserves satisability. In Section 2.3, we prove a number
of undecidability results, based on this translation.
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2.1. Logic and sketches
We rst give precise denitions of classical nitary rst-order logic and of sketches,
and then we discuss the known connections between them. The denitions given in this
section are all elementary, but since both classical logic and sketches can be presented
in many dierent ways, we prefer to state the denitions clearly before we embark on
constructing a translation between them.
2.1.1. Classical nitary rst-order logic
We describe a minimalistic version of classical nitary rst-order logic. A logical
language is determined by giving a set of relation symbols, denoted 1; 2; : : : Every
relation symbol has an associated arity, which is a natural number. We assume that a
countable set of variables is given. Variables are denoted by x1; x2; : : :
The atomic formulae of the language are syntactic expressions of the form xi = xj
(with xi and xj variables) or (xk1 ; xk2 ; : : : ; xkn) where n is the arity of the relation
symbol .
The formulae of the given logical language are built up from the atomic formulae
using the logical combinators :;^ and the quantier 9. More precisely: all atomic for-
mulae are formulae, and if  is a formula, then : and (9x) are formulae, and if 
and  are formulae, then ^  is a formula. The other logical connectors and the uni-
versal quantier can be dened in terms of the connectors and quantier given above.
The free variables of a formula are dened in the standard way. A sentence is a
formula without any free variables.
A theory in a given logical language is a set of formulae of that logical language.
An interpretation of a logical language consists of a set U , and for each relation
symbol  of arity n an n-ary relation on U . Given such an interpretation, any formula
 with free variables x1; : : : ; xn denes an n-ary relation on U , called the extension of 
in the interpretation. We say the formula is satised if this extension is the total relation
(i.e. the nth cartesian power of U ). A model of a theory is an interpretation, such that
each formula of the theory is satised. A theory is satisable if there exists a model.
2.1.2. Finitary sketches
We stick to the denition of sketch, given by Barr and Wells in [8]. Hence, a sketch
is a quadruple (G;D;L;K), with G a graph, D a set of diagrams in G, L a set of
cones in G and K a set of cocones in G. The sketch is nitary if each of the cones
and cocones in L and K is nite. The sketch is nite if G and each of the sets
D;L;K is nite.
A model of a sketch (G;D;L;K) in a category C (e.g. Set or FinSet), is a graph
homomorphism from G to C, taking each diagram in D to a commutative diagram,
each cone in L to a limit cone, and each cocone in K to a colimit cocone.
We will freely use the notational conventions for sketches described in [8]. In
particular, this means that if we introduce an object in the graph G, with name
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a1 a2     an, then this implies that there are already objects with names a1 up
to an, and moreover this implies that there is a cone pi : a1 a2     an! ai in L.
The name an is an abbreviation for a a     a (n times). Moreover, if there is
an arrow in G, decorated with a tip in the front (like f :AB), this implies that the
following cone is in L (i.e. this implies f is mono in every model):
2.1.3. Connections between string-based logic and sketches
As already discussed above, the connections between sketches and classical, string-
based logic, are usually studied by looking at the model categories of specications in
both formalisms. A class of sketches and a fragment of logic are said to be equivalent
if they give rise to the same class of model categories. For example, in this sense,
sketches are equivalent to (innitary) basic theories.
Here, we will describe a correspondence between sketches and classical rst-order
logic from a dierent point of view. We will describe a translation from a rst-order
theory to a sketch with the property that every model of the theory denes a model
of the sketch and vice versa. Hence, in a sense, the model categories have ‘the same
objects’, even though they do not have ‘the same morphisms’. In particular, the model
category of the logical theory is empty i the model category of the corresponding
sketch is empty. Or, in other words, the translation preserves satisability.
2.2. A satisability-preserving translation
Given a logical theory T in a logical language L, we will construct a corresponding
nitary sketch ST. The construction happens in three stages. First, we construct the
sketch corresponding to a logical language. Then, we show how logical formulae can
be represented in the sketch. And nally, we show how a logical formula can be
required to be satised in every model.
2.2.1. The sketch corresponding to a logical language
We start with proving the (obvious and easy) fact that interpretations of a logical
language can be captured by means of a sketch.
Lemma 1. For every logical language L; there exists a nitary sketch SL such that
every interpretation of L denes a model of SL; and vice versa.
In fact, we could say something stronger: the category of interpretations of L is
equivalent to the category of models of SL.
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Proof. Let L consist of the relation symbols i, and let ai be the arity of i. Let A
be the set of all the ai. The sketch SL will have the following objects:
{ An object U .
{ An object Uk for all k 2A.
{ An object Si for each relation symbol i.
(Recall our notational conventions for objects: the fact that an object Uk is introduced
implies that the necessary arrows and cones making this the kth power of U are also
introduced.)
The sketch has the following arrows:
{ An arrow i : SiU
ai for each relation symbol i.
(Recall our notational conventions for arrows: for each arrow introduced above, a cone
will be added stating that this arrow must be mono.)
A model of this sketch in Set will assign a set to U , and a subset of the aith power
of U to each Si . In other words, models of the sketch SL and interpretations of the
logical language L are essentially the same.
Note that if L is nite, then SL will also be nite. Note also that nite models of
L dene nite models of SL and vice versa.
2.2.2. Representing a logical formula in a sketch
Now, given a formula  in a logical language L, we will show how we can extend
the sketch SL (in a conservative way) so that it contains an arrow b which is taken
to the extension of  in every model. More precisely, we prove:
Lemma 2. For every formula  in a logical language L; there exists a nitary
sketch SL such that every interpretation I of L denes a model M of S

L and vice
versa. Moreover; SL contains an arrow b : []!Uk (where k is the number of free
variables of ) such that this arrow is taken by M to the extension of  in I .
Proof (sketch). Only an outline of the proof is given. The full proof can be found
in [15]. Essentially, one has to prove that the extension of a formula  can be computed
by (nitary) limits and colimits, starting from the arrows i : SiU
ai representing
the interpretation of the relation symbols of the logical language. This is shown by
induction on the size of the formula . We proceed as follows. We assume that a
model of the sketch SL (or equivalently, an interpretation of the underlying logical
language of T) is given. For any formula  with n free variables, we will compute
an arrow b : []!Un together with an isomorphism l from the set n= f0; 1; : : : ;
n− 1g to the set of free variables of . This arrow [] represents the extension of the
formula  in the following sense: Let  be a mapping of the free variables of  to U
(the universe of the given interpretation);  is satised by this mapping i the arrow
h(l(0)); (l(1)); : : : ; (l(n− 1))i : 1!Un factors through b. The computation of
the arrow b will start from the interpretation of the arrows of the sketch SL in the
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given model of SL, and moreover, the computation will be done using only nitary
limits and colimits.
In this outline, we only consider the case of an atomic formula (xk1 ; : : : ; xkr ) and
the case of the formula :. All other cases (which are similar) are discussed in the
full proof in [15].
The formula (xk1 ; : : : ; xkr ). Consider an atomic formula (xk1 ; : : : ; xkr ) where  is a
relation symbol of arity r. Let the set of free variables of this formula have cardinality n.
Pick an arbitrary bijection l(xk1 ;:::; xkr ) : n! FV((xk1 ; : : : ; xkr )) (we will abbreviate the
name of this morphism to l). The arrow [(xk1 ; : : : ; xkr ) is computed by the following
pullback:
It is straightforward to verify that this arrow indeed represents the extension of
(xk1 ; : : : ; xkr ).
The formula :. Suppose l is the isomorphism from n to the set of free variables
of . : has the same set of free variables, and we take l: to be equal to l. By
induction, we assume we have an arrow b representing . We take c: to be the
complement of this arrow (and this complement is unique up to isomorphism in Set
or FinSet). This complement is completely determined in Set or FinSet by requiring
the following cocone to be a sum-cocone.
It is again easy to prove that c: correctly represents the formula :. Note however
that, when we will use this construction in a sketch, this will strongly inuence the
homomorphisms of models of the sketch. Although the sketch will have in essence the
same models as the logical theory, there will be much less homomorphisms between
models of the sketch than there are homomorphisms between models of the logical
theory.
2.2.3. The sketch corresponding to a logical theory
Theorem 3. For every nite logical theory T; there exists a nite nitary sketch
ST; such that every model of T denes a model of ST and vice versa. Moreover;
every nite model of T denes a nite model of ST and vice versa.
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Contrary to the situation in Lemma 1, it is not true here, that the model categories
of T and ST are equivalent. The theorem does generalize to the innite case, but
since we do not need this generalization, this will not be proved.
Proof. Every nite logical theory is equivalent to a theory containing only one sentence
(rst take the universal closure of all formulae in the theory, and then combine all the
resulting sentences by taking their conjunction). Let this sentence be . Construct the
sketch SL whose existence is assured by Lemma 2. By Lemma 2, the object [] will
be taken to the empty set if  is not satised in a model, and to the terminal set if 
is satised. Hence, to construct ST, it suces to add one cone to S

L stating that the
object [] must be taken to the terminal object. The proof of the last sentence of the
theorem is trivial.
2.3. Finite satisability and equivalence
The satisability preserving translation (Theorem 3) is used to prove the undecid-
ability of a number of interesting problems.
First recall that nite satisability of a nite rst-order theory is undecidable. A
proof of this result can be found in [1]. Note that this result is quite dierent from
the classical result that satisability (allowing innite models) of a rst-order theory
is undecidable. Satisability of a rst-order theory is co-semi-decidable, whereas nite
satisability is semi-decidable.
Given Theorem 3, we immediately obtain as a corollary:
Corollary 4. The problem of determining whether a nite nitary sketch has a nite
model is undecidable.
Proof. Suppose this problem was decidable. By the construction of Theorem 3, we
could decide the nite satisability problem for classical rst-order logic. But this is
known to be undecidable. Contradiction.
Corollary 5. The ( nite) equivalence problem for nite nitary sketches is undecid-
able.
The nite equivalence problem is the problem of determining whether two sketches
have equivalent model categories in FinSet.
Proof. It is easy to construct a nite nitary sketch that is not satisable. Take for
example the sketch with one object, a cone stating that the object is terminal, and a
cocone stating that the object is initial. Another nite nitary sketch will be equivalent
to this sketch i it has no nite models. But this is undecidable by Corollary 4.
It should be noted that the equivalence problem is in general much harder than the
satisability problem. For instance, for nite limit sketches satisability is a trivial
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problem (every nite limit sketch is satisable), but the equivalence problem is unde-
cidable.
3. Data specications
In this section, we recall denitions and known results from the sketch-based ap-
proach to semantic data modelling. For more details, and an extensive motivation of
the usefulness of this approach, see [14, 17, 18].
3.1. General data specications
Essentially, the goal of a data specication is to build a mathematical description of
a small part of the real world. This part of the real world is called the Universe of
Discourse (UoD) in database theory. As explained in the introduction, the mathematical
structures that will be used to describe the UoD are nite models of sketches, together
with a labelling of all the elements of these models by elements of possibly innite
sets of values.
Hence, a data specication consists of two parts. The rst part is a sketch, and this
sketch species the structure and the interdependencies of the various entities about
which we want to store information. The second part indicates what kind of information
we want to store about each type of entity: for each type of entity, we give its set of
possible attribute values, i.e. the set of all possible labels that an entity of the given
type can have.
3.1.1. Denitions
Denition 6. A data specication consists of:
(i) a sketch S=(G;D;L;K), where G is a graph, D is a set of diagrams in G
(that must be taken to commutative diagrams in a model), L is a set of cones in G
(that must be taken to limit cones in a model) and K is a set of cocones in G (that
must be taken to colimit cocones in a model).
(ii) for each T 2G0, a nite set AT , called the set of attributes of entity type T , and
for each a2AT an attribute set ST (a).
The objects of G are called entity types, the arrows are called dependencies between
entity types.
Often, it is convenient to group all the information concerning the attributes into one
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where the product of an empty family of sets is the terminal set. The functor A maps
an entity type T to the set of all possible labels that entities of type T can attain in a
model. The projection from A(T ) to ST (a) will be denoted as pa.
Denition 7. A model of a data specication is a couple (M; ), where M :G!FinSet
is a model of the sketch S and  : J M  I !A is a natural transformation (where
I :C0!C and J :FinSet!Set are the obvious inclusions).
The component M of a model (M; ) indicates what entities exist in the UoD, and
the component  labels each entity of type T with an element of A(T ) (and such an
element is in fact a tuple of values, one for each attribute of T ).
Denition 8. A homomorphism from a model (M; ) to a model (M 0; 0) is a natural
transformation  :M !M 0 satisfying the equation 0  Ij= .
3.1.2. Notational conventions
Denition 9. A source in a category C is a pair (X; (fi)i2I ) consisting of an object X
of C and a family of morphisms fi :X ! Yi of C, indexed by some set I .
A source is nite if the indexing set I is nite. If the indexing function i 7!fi is
injective, then we say that the source is a source without doubles. Any source can
be reduced to a source without doubles by striking out all the duplicates, i.e. take the
epi-mono factorization of the indexing function, and retain only the mono-part.
A source (X; (fi)i2I ) is a mono source if fi  x=fi y for all i2 I implies that
x=y. Note that a source is mono i its associated source without doubles is mono.
In data specications, one often wants to state that a certain source in the graph
G must be taken to a mono source in each model. Therefore, we introduce a special
notation for this: a data specication may contain a set M of sources in G (called
monicity constraints), and each of these sources must be taken to a mono source in
every model. This is a pure syntactic extension of data specications: every monicity
constraint could be removed by adding an appropriate cone to L.
Secondly, we propose a suitable notation for the attribute part of a specication.
We dene the attributes and attribute sets by dening the attribute functor A. The
value of the attribute functor on an entity type T will be denoted as follows:
T 7! a1 : ST (a1);
a2 : ST (a2);
...
an : ST (an):
where the ai are the attributes of entity type T , and where ST (ai) is the attribute set
corresponding to attribute ai. Recall that A(T ) is dened to be the product of all the
ST (ai).
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Examples of data specications will be given in Section 3.2. The interested reader
can nd many examples, commented in detail in [14].
3.1.3. Semantical equivalence of data specications
Semantical equivalence is meant to capture the informal notion of \describing the
same part of the real world". A number of possible formal denitions for this notion
have been studied and compared in [14, 18]. The following denition seems the most
appropriate.
Denition 10. Two data specications are semantically equivalent i their model cate-
gories are equivalent as categories.
Theorem 11. Semantical equivalence is undecidable.
Proof. Consider data specications with no attributes (the attribute functor is the con-
stant functor on 1). The model category of such a specication is exactly the category
of FinSet-valued models of the underlying sketch of the data specication. Hence, an
algorithm to decide semantical equivalence would, for this special case, be an algorithm
to decide nite equivalence of sketches. But, by Corollary 5, this is an undecidable
problem.
Partial solutions to the semantical equivalence problem have been proposed. In [18],
an incomplete and interactive algorithm for deciding semantical equivalence is de-
scribed. This algorithm tries to establish an equivalence between the theories of the
underlying sketches of the data specications.
In [14, 16, 17], subclasses of data specications have been dened, for which the
semantical equivalence problem is decidable. We recall some of these results in the
next section, since the development of the new algorithm in Section 4 will rely on
them.
3.2. Finite mono specications
Finite mono specications (or FM specications in short) are a special kind of
data specications, for which the semantical equivalence problem is more manageable.
Moreover, they are important from a practical point of view, because they encompass
Entity Relationship diagrams [10].
3.2.1. Denitions
Denition 12. An FM specication is a triple (C;M;A), where C is a nite category,
M is a nite set of nite sources in C, and A :C0!Set is a functor.
Denition 13. A model of an FM specication (C;M;A) is a pair (M; ), where
(i) M :C!FinSet is a functor taking every 2M to a mono source.
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(ii)  : J M  I !A is a natural transformation, where J :FinSet!Set and I :C0!
C are the obvious inclusions.
FM specications are clearly a special case of the general denition of data speci-
cations.
Example 14. Let N denote the set of natural numbers, and S the set of strings over the
ASCII alphabet. Both these sets are innite. The following specication is an example
of an FM specication:
A model (M; ) must be understood as follows. The model M of the sketch associates
with each entity type the set of entities of that type existing in the real world (e.g. it
associates a set of three persons with the PERSON type). The labelling  will label each
of these persons with a natural number (the age), a string (the name) and an element
of fmale, femaleg. Arrows in the graph indicate dependencies: an entity of the source
type is always associated with an entity of the target type (e.g. a member is always
associated with a person and with a library). Such dependencies are taken to functions
between the sets of entities by M .
For a more detailed discussion of this example, see [14, 18].
3.2.2. Semantical equivalence of FM specications
Since FM specications are much less expressive than general data specications,
the semantical equivalence problem is less hard. It is known, for instance [17], that
semantical equivalence is decidable in the case that all attribute sets are nite.
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For FM specications with innite attribute sets, no algorithm to decide semantical
equivalence has been found yet. In the next section, we will present an algorithm for
an important subclass of FM specications. The correctness proof of this algorithm
will rely on the property of FM specications to allow for selective elimination of
attributes [19]. We briey recall what selective elimination of attributes is.
Suppose we are given an FM specication (C;M;A), a functor X :C0!FinSet
(which we also sometimes consider as X :C0!Set) and a natural transformation
 :A!X . Let, as usual, I :C0!C be the inclusion, I : Fun(C;Set)! Fun(C0;Set)
the functor of composition with I , and (−)! : Fun(C0;Set)! Fun(C;Set) the right ad-
joint to I. Hence X ! will be the right Kan extension of X along I . We want to





F is the category of elements of a Set-valued functor F .
{ M0= f j()2Mg, where  is the canonical projection of R X ! on C.
It remains to dene A0. Note that A0 must be a set, typed by the objects of
R
X !.
Since the elements of I(X !) are in bijection with the objects of
R
X !, it suces to give
an arrow 0 :A0! I(X !) in Fun(C0;Set). We dene this arrow to be the pullback
of  along the counit  of the adjunction between I and (−)!. Hence, the following








This denes the functor A0 :C00!Set up to natural isomorphism.
We say that (C0;M0;A0) is obtained from (C;M;A) by elimination over .
The functor X and the natural transformation  must be seen as the denition of a
partition on the sets of attribute values. What attribute elimination does, is introducing
a new entity type for each equivalence class in this partition, and this in such a way
that the resulting specication is semantically equivalent.
Theorem 15. Let (C0;M0;A0) be obtained from (C;M;A) by elimination over
 :A!X . If X ! satises the monicity conditions in M; then the model categories of
(C;M;A) and (C0;M0;A0) are equivalent.
This theorem is proved in [19].
Example 16. Consider again specication (1). We want to eliminate the attribute Sex
from the entity type PERSON. Therefore, we consider a partition of the attribute sets
which separates the elements male and female, but which does not separate any other
elements. In other words we consider the natural transformation  :A!X where X
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is the functor taking PERSON to fmale, femaleg and taking all other entity types to the
terminal set, and where PERSON is the projection on the set fmale, femaleg and all other
components of  are the unique functions into the terminal set. It is straightforward to
verify that X ! satises all monicity conditions.
Eliminating over  gives us the following specication:
By Theorem 15, we know that specications (1) and (2) are semantically equivalent.
4. Thin nite mono specications
Following the terminology in [8], we call a category thin i all the hom-sets have at
most one element. Thin nite mono specications are nite mono specications with a
thin underlying category. Hence, all the results proved for FM specications are also
valid for Thin FM specications. In particular, equivalence is decidable if all attribute
sets are nite, and attributes can be selectively eliminated.
In addition, we will prove in this paper, that for thin nite mono specications,
attributes can be introduced selectively, and we will show that thin nite mono speci-
cations can be reduced to a canonical form, where as many attributes have been
introduced as possible. Reduction to normal form provides a new algorithm for deciding
equivalence, which is superior to the algorithm discussed in [17], because it also works
for innite attribute sets.
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4.1. Denition and examples
Denition 17. A Thin Finite Mono specication (TFM specication) is an FM speci-
cation (C;M;A), where C is a thin category.
Denition 18. Two TFM specications (C;M;A) and (C0;M0;A0) are equal if there
exists an isomorphism i :C!C0 with the following properties:
(i) 2M i i()2M0.
(ii) For all objects T of C, A(T ) and A0(i(T )) have the same cardinality (i.e. are
isomorphic as sets).
It should be obvious that two equal TFM specications are equivalent.
We show in a series of lemmas that, without loss of generality, we may make the
following assumptions about a TFM specication (C;M;A):
(i) All the representable functors from C satisfy all monicity conditions in M.
(ii) C is skeletal.
(iii) M is closed, in the sense that it contains precisely all sources without doubles
in C that are taken to mono sources in all models of (C;M).
(iv) A(X ) is nonempty for all objects X of C.
These assumptions will simplify the development of the algorithm to decide equiva-
lence of TFM specications.
That assumption (i) can be made without loss of generality follows from
Lemma 2.12 in [17].
Assumption (ii) is justied by the following lemma:
Lemma 19. For each TFM specication (C;M;A); there exists an equivalent TFM
specication (C0;M0;A0) with C0 skeletal.
Proof. Let C0 be a skeleton of C, and let p be the projection on this skeleton. Let





It is straightforward to verify that (C0;M0;A0) and (C;M;A) have equivalent model
categories.
We will often regard a thin skeletal category C as a partially ordered set C=(C0;)
(see Section 4.2).
Assumption (iv) is justied by:
Lemma 20. For each TFM specication (C;M;A); there exists an equivalent TFM
specication (C0;M0;A0) with the property that A0(T 0) is nonempty for all T 0 2C00.
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Proof. Suppose A(T )= ;. Then, in any model (F; ) of (C;M;A), F(T ) must be
the empty set. Hence, (C;M;A) is equivalent to (C0;M0;A0) with:
{ C0 is the full subcategory of C containing all the objects T for which A(T ) is
nonempty.
{ M0= ffi :X ! Yi 2M jX 2C0g
{ A0 is the restriction of A to C00.
Finally, recall from Section 3.1.2 that a source is a mono source i the same source
with all doubles removed is a mono source. Hence, only sources without doubles need
be considered for specications. Moreover, in a nite category C, only a nite number
of sources without doubles exist. Because of Proposition 2.13 in [17], given an arbitrary
TFM specication (C;M;A), we can compute an equivalent new set M0 of monicity
conditions, which contains only sources without doubles, and is closed in the following
sense: 2M0 i  is taken to a mono source by all functors F :C!FinSet which
satisfy all monicity conditions in M0. This justies Assumption (iii).
4.2. Thin categories as posets
A small category with at most one arrow between any two objects is essentially
the same as a preordered set. If the thin category is skeletal, then it corresponds to
a poset. Let C be a thin category, and X an object of C. We write "X for the full
subcategory containing exactly those objects of C that are greater than X . Sometimes,
we also have to consider the full subcategory containing exactly those objects of C
that are not greater than X . We will denote this preordered set as Cn "X . It is the full
subcategory of C, spanned by those objects that have no arrow to X .
4.3. Thin MD sketches
The correctness proof of the algorithm for deciding semantical equivalence of TFM
specications will rely on the translation of the specication to a peculiar kind of
sketch, a so-called thin MD sketch. MD sketches (not necessarily thin) have already
been used in the study of FM specications [14, 17], and some of the results from this
section are straightforward extensions of previously published results on MD sketches.
Therefore, we will omit most of the proofs in this section, and refer the reader to older
work on MD sketches [14, 17] instead.
Denition 21. A double-source in a category C is a pair of two nite sources fi :X !
Yi and gi : Z! Yi in C, on the same base.
We say that a double-source (fi; gi) is disjoint, i its limit is the initial object.
In FinSet, the category of nite sets and functions, this means that there are no elements
x2X and z 2Z such that fi(x)= gi(z) for all i.
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Denition 22. A thin MD sketch is a triple (C;M;D) where C is a thin category,
M is a set of nite sources in C, D is a set of double-sources in C.
Denition 23. A model of a thin MD sketch (C;M;D) is a nitely presentable func-
tor from C to FinSet, which takes every source in M to a mono source and every
double-source in D to a disjoint double-source.
The reason for requiring nitely presentability will become clear after we study the
translation from TFM specications to thin MD sketches.
For thin MD sketches, disjointness conditions (fi :X ! Yi; gi : Z! Yi) with X = Z
make no sense, because such a disjointness condition can only be satised if X is taken
to the empty set. Hence, we can always nd an equivalent thin MD sketch without
such disjointness conditions. Therefore, from now on, the assumption will be made
that disjointness conditions (fi :X ! Yi; gi : Z! Yi) in a thin MD sketch always have
X 6= Z .
Denition 24. An MD sketch (C;M;D) is in canonical form if the following condi-
tions are satised:
(i) C is skeletal and Cauchy complete.
(ii) All the representable functors from C are models.
(iii) M and D are closed, in the sense that they contain any source (respectively
double-source) which is taken to a mono source (respectively disjoint double-source)
in every model.
There are two important theorems about thin MD sketches:
Theorem 25. Two MD sketches in canonical form are equivalent i they are isomor-
phic.
The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of Theorem 2.18 in [17], and
hence is not repeated here.
Denition 26. Let (C;M;A) be a TFM specication. Let A! be the right Kan ex-
tension of A along I :C0!C and let
R
A! be the category of elements of A!, with
associated projection  :
R
A!!C. We dene the translation of (C;M;A) to be the
thin MD sketch (C t ;Mt ;Dt); where
(i) C t is
R
A!.
(ii) Mt is f j()2Mg.
(iii) D t is f(fi :X ! Yi; gi : Z! Yi) jX 6= Z;(fi)=(gi)2Mg.
Note that C t is thin (because C is thin).
Theorem 27. The model category of a TFM specication (C;M;A) is equivalent to
the model category of its translation (C t ;Mt ;Dt).
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The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of Theorem 4.3 in [17]. This
theorem is only valid if one considers only nitely presentable models of thin MD
sketches, which is why we required models to be nitely presentable in Denition 23.
For TFM specications, this translation is particularly easy to construct. First, let
us construct
R
A! for A :C0!Set where C is thin. We treat C as an ordered set
(C0;). The set of objects of
R




The ordering relation 0 of R A! is given by
(c; a) 0 (d; b) i cd and 8x c :px( a)=px(b);
where px :
Q
ycA(y)!A(x) is the projection.
The verication that this ordered set actually denes
R
A! is straightforward, and is




A! is the following poset (thin category):
Now, let a TFM specication (C;M;A) be given. We dene a thin MD sketch
(C t ;Mt ;Dt) as follows:
{ C t0 = f(c; a) j c2C0; a 2
Q
xcA(x)g;
{ (c; a) t (d; b) i cd and 8x c :px( a)=px(b);
{  :C t !C=(c; a) 7! c;
{ Mt = f j ()2Mg;
{ Dt = f j ()2Mg.
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Lemma 29. (C t ;Mt ;Dt); computed by the translation given above; is exactly the
equivalent MD sketch of (C;M;A) as computed in Denition 26.  :C t !C is the
associated projection.
The proof is just a straightforward verication.
Let D tc be the closure of D
t .
Lemma 30. (C t ;Mt ;Dtc ) is the unique MD sketch in canonical form; equivalent to
(C;M;A).
Proof. That (C t ;Mt ;Dtc ) is in canonical form follows from our assumptions on TFM
specications (Section 4.1). That it is equivalent to (C;M;A) follows from Lemma 29.
That an MD sketch in canonical form, equivalent to (C;M;A), is unique up to iso-
morphism follows from Theorem 25.
4.4. Introduction of attributes
In Section 3, we have dened selective elimination of attributes. Now, we want to
study the inverse process: selective introduction of attributes. The key problem is to
recognize those entity types that are suciently similar so that we can merge them
into one entity type with an attribute. Two entity types c1 and c2 which are suciently
similar will be called an In-redex:
Denition 31. An In-redex of a TFM specication (C;M;A) is a pair (c1; c2) of
elements of C0, such that:
(i) " c1 and " c2 are disjoint.
(ii) There exists an isomorphism l :C!C, satisfying the conditions:
(a) The following diagram commutes:
where i is the obvious inclusion.
(b) l(c1)= c2 and l(c2)= c1.
(c) l  l= IdC.
(d) 2M, l()2M
(e) A(l(x))=A(x) for all x 6= c1 (by equality of these sets, we mean equality
of their cardinal numbers).
(f) 2M implies that (; l()) is not a double-source.
We prove that this denition indeed characterizes those pairs of entity types that are
suciently similar to be merged into one entity type with an attribute.
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Suppose we are given a TFM specication (C;M;A) and an In-redex (c1; c2). We
dene
C0=Cn " c2;
 :C!C0= x 7! x if x 62 " c2;
x 7! l(x) if x2 " c2:
This denes a new category C0 and a functor  :C!C0. We prove that this func-
tor is actually a discrete opbration. Given an object r of C0, we dene the functor
2r :C00!FinSet, which takes r to a set with two elements (say f1, 2g) and all other
objects to a terminal set (say fg). Let us write Dof(C) for the category of discrete
opbrations over C.
Lemma 32.  :C!C0 is a discrete opbration; and the functor corresponding to 




2!c1 , as indicated in Section 4.3. The set of objects of
R
2!c1 is
(Cn " c1n " c2) ] f(x; 1) j x2" c1g ] f(x; 2) j x2" c1g:
We dene j :C! R 2!c1 as follows:
j(x) = x if x2Cn " c1n " c2
= (x; 1) if x2 " c1
= (x; 2) if x2 " c2:
It can be veried that j is an isomorphism making the following diagram commute:
This proves the lemma.
Next, dene A0 :C00!Set:
A0(c)=A(c) if c 6= c1;
A0(c1)=A(c1) ]A(c2):
Let 0 :A0! 2c1 be the following natural transformation: 0c1 is the function taking
all elements of A(c1) to 1 and all elements of A(c2) to 2, and 0c, for c 6= c1, is the
unique function from A0(c) to the terminal set.
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Since C is isomorphic to
R
2!c1 , A denes an arrow  into I
(2!c1 ).
Lemma 33. This arrow  is the pullback 0 along 2c1 : I
(2!c1 )! 2c1 .
Proved by inspection.
Finally, dene M0 to be the subset of M containing exactly those sources which lie
completely in C0.
Lemma 34. 2M0 , ()2M:
Denition 35. Suppose we are given a TFM specication (C;M;A) with an In-redex
(c1; c2), and suppose (C0;M0;A0) is constructed as indicated above, then we say that
(C;M;A) In-reduces to (C0;M0;A0).
We denote this as (C;M;A) In−! (C0;M0;A0).
Theorem 36. If S In−!S0 then S and S0 are equivalent.
Proof. This is because S is obtained from S0 by elimination over . This fact is
easily proved using the lemmas above. The theorem follows then immediately from
Theorem 15. The only diculty left is proving that 2!c1 satises all monicity conditions
in M0. This follows from condition (f) in Denition 31.
Hence, repeatedly In-reducing a TFM specication introduces more and more or
larger and larger attribute sets. It is clear that this process of In-reducing must terminate
somewhere.
Denition 37. A TFM specication containing no In-redices is said to be in In-normal
form.
Every TFM specication can be In-reduced to an In-normal form in a nite number
of steps:
Lemma 38. In-reduction is terminating.
Proof. With every In-reduction step, the number of objects of the underlying category
of the TFM specication decreases.
The main result about In-reduction is that it yields a decision procedure for equiva-
lence:
Theorem 39 (Uniqueness). In-normal forms are unique. Moreover; two TFM speci-
cations are equivalent i they have the same In-normal form.
The proof of this theorem is rather long and technical, and we give it in a separate
section (Section 4.5)
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Based on Theorem 39, we can decide equivalence in the following way: given two
TFM specications S1 and S2, compute their respective In-normal forms. S1 and S2 are
equivalent i these In-normal forms are equal. However, recall all the assumptions we
have made about TFM specications (see Section 4.1). If we drop these assumptions,
the algorithm to decide equivalence of two TFM specications works as follows:
(i) Compute two equivalent TFM specications with the property that all rep-
resentable functors satisfy all monicity conditions using the algorithm outlined in
Lemma 2.12 in [17].
(ii) From the resulting specications, remove all entity types with empty attribute
sets, as indicated in Lemma 20.
(iii) Skeletize the underlying categories as indicated in Lemma 19.
(iv) Compute the closures of the sets of monicity conditions, using the algorithm
contained in the proof of Proposition 2.13 in [17].
(v) Reduce the two resulting TFM specications to In-normal form.
(vi) If the resulting In-normal forms are equal, then the two given TFM specications
are equivalent, otherwise they are not.
Example 40. As a rst example of In-reduction, consider again specications (1)
and (2). Specication (1) is already in In-normal form (MAN,WOMAN) is an In-redex for
specication (2). In-reducing over this In-redex gives a specication equal to speci-
cation (1).
Example 41. To show that In-reduction can sometimes introduce attributes where one
would not expect it, consider the following specication:
(PERSON,BOOK) is an In-redex of this specication. Indeed, from a formal point of view,
PERSON and BOOK are completely similar in this specication. In-reduction leads to a
specication isomorphic to:
In this specication, persons and books are considered to be of entity type OBJECT.
Objects can be possessed by a library. For a book object this corresponds to actual
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possession. For a person object, this means that the person is a member of the library.
This second specication can be seen to be semantically equivalent to the rst.
4.5. Proof of the uniqueness theorem
We now set out to prove Theorem 39. Our overall strategy to prove the theorem is
as follows:
(i) We know that any two equivalent TFM specications have the same equivalent
MD sketch in canonical form. We have constructed this unique canonical MD sketch
in Section 4.3.
(ii) From this MD sketch, we can reconstruct a TFM specication in In-normal
form in a unique way (Lemmas 44 and 49).
Hence, any two equivalent TFM specications in In-normal form are equal
(Lemma 50).
(iii) Now, given TFM specications S1 and S2, with In-normal forms S01 and S
0
2 ,
we know that S1 is equivalent with S01 and S2 with S
0





are equivalent i they are equal. Hence, S1 and S2 are equivalent i their In-normal
forms are equal.
Let (Ct ;Mt ;Dtc) be the canonical MD sketch equivalent with (C;M;A), and let
 :Ct !C be the associated projection. Given a2 Qc2C0A(c), this determines a full
subcategory of Ct , which we will denote as Ctj a, and which is dened to be the full
subcategory on the following set of objects:
f(c; b) j 8x c: px( b)=px( a)g:
In other words, all elements of tuple b must be contained in tuple a.
Lemma 42. Full subcategories of the form Ctj a are in one-to-one correspondence with
images of sections of .
Proof. Given a tuple a2 Qx2C0A(x), we dene a section S :C!Ct of  as follows:
S(c)= (c; b) where px( b)=px( a) for all x c.
It is easy to verify that this denes a section of .
Vice versa, every section S denes a tuple a as follows. S(x) is necessarily of the
form (x; b). Dene px( a) to be px( b).
Finally, observe that the two constructions given above are each others inverses.
This proves the lemma.
Example 43. Consider specication (3). Ct for this specication is category (4). It is
easy to see that each of the tuples (1; ; a); (1; ; b); (2; ; a); (2; ; b) denes a section
of .
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Lemma 44. Given all images of sections of ; it is possible to reconstruct (C;M;A).
Proof. C is of course isomorphic to the image of any section. M is the restriction of
Mt to the image. It remains to reconstruct A.















and hence the cardinality of any A((c)) can be computed as #(
T
x<c Ix)=#Ic (re-
member our assumption that attribute sets are non-empty, and hence the two cardinal
numbers above are dierent from zero). Thus, we reconstruct A up to natural isomor-
phism.
It turns out that, in the case that (C;M;A) is in In-normal form, images of sections
of  can also be characterized independently of C or . This characterization is based
on the concept of In-redex for an MD sketch. Hence, we rst dene this concept, and
prove a number of lemmas about In-redices for MD sketches.
Again, an In-redex for an MD sketch will be a pair of entity types (c1; c2) that are
suciently similar to be merged into one entity type with an attribute to distinguish
between type c1 and type c2. Note the similarity with Denition 31.
Denition 45. An In-redex of an MD sketch (C;M;D) is a pair (c1; c2) of elements
of C0, such that:
(i) " c1 and " c2 are disjoint.
(ii) There exists an isomorphism l :C!C; satisfying the conditions:
(a){(d) are the same as conditions (ii)(a){(d) in Denition 31.
(e) 2D, l()2D
(f) If 2M, and (; l()) is a double-source then (; l())2D.
The following lemma states that two objects of the MD sketch that represent the
same entity type in the TFM specication, but with a dierent attribute value, are
indeed an In-redex for the MD sketch.
Lemma 46. A pair ((c; a); (c; a0)) with px( a)=px( a0) for all x<c but pc( a) 6=pc( a0)
is an In-redex for the MD sketch (Ct ;Mt ;Dtc).
Proof. (i) " (c; a) and " (c; a0) are disjoint: any element (d; b) t (c; a) has pc( b)=
pc( a) and any element (d; b) t (c; a0) has pc( b)=pc( a0).
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(ii) The isomorphism l :Ct !Ct is dened as follows:
(d; b) 7! (d; b) if (c; a) 6t (d; b) and (c; a0) 6t (d; b)
(d; b) 7! (d; b0) if (c; a) t (d; b); where
pc( b0)=pc( a0)
px( b0)=px( b) if x 6= c
(d; b) 7! (d; b0) if (c; a0) t (d; b); where
pc( b0)=pc( a)
px( b0)=px( b) if x 6= c:
The verication that l is an isomorphism, and that it satises all necessary conditions,
is left to the reader.
Two elements c1 = (c; a) and c2 = (c0; a0) are called incompatible if there is no image
of a section of  containing both c1 and c2. This means that there is a d  c; c0 such
that pd( a) 6=pd( a0).
Lemma 47. Given two incompatible elements c1; c2 of Ct ; there exist x t c1 and
y t c2 such that (x; y) is an In-redex for the MD sketch (Ct ;Mt ;Dtc); and such that
x and y are also incompatible.
Proof. Suppose c1 = (c; a) and c2 = (c0; a0). Choose the minimal d such that pd( a)
6=pd( a0). Let x, respectively y, be the unique element of the form (d; b), respectively
(d; b0), under c1, respectively, c2 in Ct . It follows by Lemma 46, that (x; y) is an
In-redex, and x and y clearly are still incompatible.
Lemma 48. Let (c1; c2) be an In-redex in an MD sketch (C;M;D); and let l be
the associated automorphism of C. Suppose (c01; c
0
2) is also an In-redex in (C;M;D).
Then (l(c01); l(c
0
2)) is also an In-redex in (C;M;D).
Proof. (i) Since l is an isomorphism, and since " c01 and " c02 are disjoint, it follows
that " l(c01) and " l(c02) are disjoint.
(ii) Let l0 be the automorphism associated to (c01; c
0
2). The automorphism associated
to (l(c01); l(c
0
2)) is l  l0  l. The verication is left to the reader.
Lemma 49. Suppose (C;M;A) is in In-normal form. The images of sections of 
are exactly the maximal; downward closed; full sub-posets of Ct ; containing no pair
(c1; c2) that is an In-redex for the MD sketch (Ct ;Mt ;Dtc).
Proof. First, note that images of sections are indeed downward closed full sub-posets
of Ct .
Secondly, by Lemma 47 any downward closed sub-poset not contained in the image
of one section will necessarily contain an In-redex.
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Hence, it only remains to prove that the image of a section S does not contain
In-redices if (C;M;A) is in In-normal form. We prove this by contradiction.
Suppose there exist compatible In-redices (i.e. In-redices (c1; c2) such that there exists
a section S of  with c1 and c2 in the image of S). Pick a maximal compatible In-
redex (say (c1; c2)) in the sense that there exist no compatible In-redices (c3; c4) with
c3; c4 c1 or c3; c4 c2. We prove that ((c1); (c2)) is an In-redex for (C;M;A),
which gives us the required contradiction, because (C;M;A) is in In-normal form.
Consider the following diagram:
In this diagram, i1 and i2 are the obvious inclusions. S is an arbitrary section of ,
containing c1 and c2 in its image. The vertical arrow labelled S is actually a restriction
of such a section S. l is the isomorphism required to exist in the denition of In-redex
for an MD sketch.
(i) This diagram commutes for any section S whose image contains c1 and c2. The
middle triangle commutes, because (c1; c2) is an In-redex for the MD sketch. The two
outer trapezia are easily seen to commute, using the fact that   S is the identity.
(ii) "(c1) and "(c2) are disjoint, because if x would be above (c1) and above
(c2), then S(x) would be above c1 and above c2, which is impossible since (c1; c2)
is an In-redex.
(iii) There exists a section S whose image contains c1 and c2, such that (  lS)
(  l  S)= IdC.
To prove this, rst note the following two facts:
(a) x and l(x) are always compatible. The proof of this fact is trivial.
(b) If x and y are compatible, then l(x) and l(y) are also compatible.
To prove this, it suces to consider x; y c1 or x; y c2, because l is the
identity on other elements. So, suppose x; y c1 (the case x; y c2 is handled
similarly), and suppose x is compatible with y but l(x) is incompatible with
l(y). By Lemma 47, we nd an In-redex (u; v) with u l(x) and v  l(y),
and u and v incompatible. It must be that u; v c2, because if this was not the
case, then l(u)= u and l(v) = v, and hence u  x and vy, which would
mean that u and v are compatible.
Hence, we have an In-redex (u; v) with:
c2  u l(x);
c2  v l(y):
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By Lemma 48, (l(u); l(v)) is an In-redex, and obviously:
c1  l(u) x;
c1  l(v)y:
Thus, l(u) and l(v) are a compatible In-redex larger than c1, which contradicts
the fact that we have chosen (c1; c2) to be a maximal compatible In-redex.
We conclude that l(x) and l(y) must be compatible.
Since images of sections are actually maximal full subposets of compatible
elements, we conclude that there exists a section S, such that l(S(x)) is always
contained in the image of S. For such a section S, the following equation
holds:
S   l  S = l  S
Using this equation, we easily prove:
(  l  S)  (  l  S)= IdC
(iv) l0=  l  S satises the conditions in the denition of an In-redex for a TFM
specication. The verication is left to the reader.
We conclude that ((c1); (c2)) is an In-redex of (C;M;A), which contradicts the
fact that (C;M;A) is in In-normal form. Hence, the image of a section cannot contain
In-redices. This completes the proof.
The proof of the following key lemma is an easy consequence of the previous three
lemmas.
Lemma 50. Any two equivalent TFM specications in In-normal form are equal.
Proof. Two equivalent TFM specications have the same equivalent canonical MD
sketch. By the previous lemma, there is a unique TFM specication in In-normal form
corresponding to such an MD sketch.
Finally, we can prove the uniqueness theorem (Theorem 39).
Proof. Every TFM specication is equivalent with each of its In-normal forms
(Theorem 36). Hence, all In-normal forms of a given TFM specication are equiva-
lent and hence equal by Lemma 50. This proves uniqueness of In-normal forms.
If two TFM specications are equivalent then their In-normal forms are equivalent
(Theorem 36, and transitivity of equivalence) and hence their In-normal forms are
equal (Lemma 50).
Vice versa, if the In-normal forms of two TFM specications are equal, it follows
that the two specications are equivalent because they are both equivalent to this In-
normal form.
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5. Conclusion and related work
This paper proves two interesting results in the context of sketch-based data specica-
tions. First, it proves the undecidability of the general semantical equivalence problem,
by constructing a satisability preserving translation from classical rst-order logic to
nite nitary sketches. This rst result is by no means surprising, and not really hard
to prove, but because of the practical relevance, we have included a proof in this paper.
Second, we prove the decidability of the semantical equivalence problem for an im-
portant subclass of data specications, the so-called Thin Finite Mono specications.
These TFM specications can have innite attribute sets, and hence their models are
metanite structures. The algorithm contained in the decidability proof is probably the
rst algorithm for deciding semantical equivalence for a non-trivial class of specica-
tions for such metanite structures.
Our sketch-based approach to data specications is closely related to work by other
authors [9, 12, 13], who have also used some kind of sketches to specify databases.
The technique used in this paper for deciding semantical equivalence could turn out to
be useful in these other closely related frameworks too.
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